Labour Policies In The DMP Model—A Theoretical Analysis by Bandopadhyay, Titas Kumar
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive





MPRA Paper No. 59622, posted 4. November 2014 05:34 UTC
1LABOUR POLICIES IN THE DMP MODEL—A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
By
Titaskumar Bandyopadhyay
Abstract: In this paper we examine different types of labour policies in the benchmark
model of DMP in both cases where job-destruction rate is exogenous and endogenous. Our
theoretical results show that the labour market tightness and the unemployment rate would
be more volatile if job-destruction is endogenous.
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Introductions: In the labour market workers search good jobs and firms also search good
workers. The unemployed workers are absorbed in the vacant positions through matching
with the firms. Production starts only when labour and firm are matched. Matching is not
an instantaneous process, rather it is time-consuming and costly. Once there is a match in
the labour market, both parties need not search for other and so search costs are saved and
this gives birth to the surplus which is shared between the labour and the matched firm. The
most commonly used surplus sharing rule is the Nash-bargaining rule. These features of the
labour market have been conceptualized in the benchmark model of Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides (called DMP hereafter).
The DMP model has been extended by introducing endogenous job-destruction, efficiency
wage relation and business cycles. We find these extensions in the models of Albrechet et
al. (1989), Cole and Regerson (1989), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Abraham et al.
(1995), Zenou and Smith (1995), Andolfatto (1996), Shimmer (2005), Zenou (2005),
Arozamena and Ceneteno (2007), Pissarides (2007) etc.
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2Matching plays the central role in the DMP model. Matching is a function of
unemployment rate and vacancy rate and is subject to CRS. The matching function has also
been used by Hall (1979), Pissarides (1979), Diamond and Maskin (1979), Bowden (1980)
etc. Mortensen (2011) considers two types of matching function: linear and quadratic.
Hosios (2003) also shows that in efficiency worker’s bargaining power is related to the
elasticity of the matching function.
In this paper, we first describe the benchmark model of the DMP and then we examine the
consequences of different labour market policies on the Nash-wage rate, labour market
tightness and on the unemployment rate in both the cases where job-destruction is
exogenous as well as endogenous. Our comparative static results show that equilibrium
unemployment rate would be more volatile if job-destruction rate is endogenous. Further,
labour policies like more unemployment benefit and / lower worker’s bargaining power
may produce different effects on unemployment rate when job-destruction is endogenous.
2. The Benchmark DMP Model:
       In the DMP model, job-matching between a job-seeker and a firm is expressed by the
matching function: ( , )m m u v , where u is the unemployment rate and v  is the vacancy
rate in the labour market and 1 2 11 22 12 21, 0; , 0 , 0.m m m m andm m   Total match flows is
m au and total job flows is .m vq  So, the job- arrival rate is ma
u
  and the job- offer
rate is .mq
v
  Matching function is assumed to possess CRS property and we can write
 . . ,m m va q
u v u
     where v
u
   is the labour market tightness and   0, 1.q e   
The Bellman equations for unemployment (U  ), employment (W  ), vacancy (V ) and jobs
filled in ( J ) are
  rU b q W U                                  (1)
 rW w W U                                                 (2)
  rV C q J V                                  (3)
rJ y w rk J                                                  (4)
Where r  is the discount rate, b is the unemployment benefit, C is the cost of maintaining
vacancy, y is the constant match productivity and q is the job offer rate,  is the job-
destruction rate, w  is the wage rate and k  is the capital hired per labour.
3Using the zero-profit condition and using Equations (3), (4) we can write the steady state








                                                              (5)
The Nash-wage equation in the DMP model is
   1w b y C rk                                                                                                 (6)
Solving (5) and (6) one gets the equilibrium values of , .w 




                                                                                                                     (7)
Equilibrium u  can be obtained from Equation (7) after determining equilibrium .
3. Comparative Static Exercises:
Taking total  differentials of Equations (5), (6) and after simple manipulations one gets1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0, 0, 0, 0, 0ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ




    
 
          
                                                                              (8)
Again, taking total differentials of (7) and using (8) one gets
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0, 0, 0, 0, 0ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
u u u u u
y r b 
                          (9)
The results obtained in (8) and (9) yield the following propositions:
Proposition 1: A positive productivity shock raises Nash-wage rate and labour market
tightness but reduces unemployment rate.
1 See Appendix A.1.
4Proposition 2:  A high discount rate reduces wage rate and market tightness but raises
unemployment rate.
Proposition 3: Labour market reforms (i.e. a lower  ) reduces wage rate and
unemployment rate but raises market tightness.
Proposotion 4: A rise in unemployment benefit raises wage rate and unemployment rate
and lowers market tightness.
Proposition 5: A higher job-destruction rate lowers wage rate and market tightness but
raises unemployment rate.
4. Endogenous Job-Destruction:
Let us now assume that the job –destruction rate is endogenous. Empirically, it has been
found that there is a strong negative relation between job- destruction rate and wage rate.
Thus, we may write
  , 0W                                                         (10)
Now taking total differentials of (5), (6), (7), (10) and after simplifications one gets
       
       
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0, 0, 0, 0,ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0, 0, 0, 0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
W W W W
y r bW W W W
y y r r b bWW W W
   
       
   
                                                                                  
                                                          (11)
and
       
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                                   
       
                (12)
The above results lead to the following propositions:
5Proposition 6: Market tightness and unemployment rate would be more volatile to changes
in productivity and / discount rate if job-destruction is endogenous.
Proposition 7: If the negative association between job-destruction and Nash-wage be very
strong, unemployment rate responds differently to changes in worker’s bargaining power
and unemployment benefit. This is different from the case where job-destruction is
exogenous.
5. Conclusions:
Search and matching are the two basic features in the labour market. The path-breaking
work in the line is the DMP model. This model analyses frictional unemployment in the
matching framework in the labor market. In the benchmark DMP model, we find that if
job-destruction is exogenous, a positive productivity shock raises Nash-wage rate and
labour market tightness but lowers equilibrium rate of unemployment. A high discount rate
reduces both the wage rate and the market tightness but raises unemployment rate. Both the
Nash-wage rate and unemployment rate rise and market tightness falls if unemployment
benefit is increased. Further, labour market reforms through the reduction in the worker’s
bargaining power lowers Nash-wage and unemployment rate but raises market tightness.
However, in reality it has been observed that job-destruction rate is more flexible than job-
destruction rate. Empirical works suggest a strong negative association between job-
destruction rate and wage rate. Our theoretical results establish that market tightness and
equilibrium unemployment rate would be more volatile if job-destruction rate is
endogenous. Further, labour market reforms and / unemployment benefits may produce
different effects on labour market tightness and unemployment rate in the case of
endogenous job-destruction rate. These theoretical results may provide an insight to the
policy makers to pursue appropriate policies in the labour market to mitigate the problem of
unemployment.
Appendices
Appendix A.1: Effects on ,W   when  is exogenous
Taking total differentials of Equations (5) and (6) and after simplifications one gets
6   ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
,
WW r Je yy J k rr Jq         (A.1)
   ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ1WW C b y C rk b yy rkr                                                      (A.2)
Using Crammer’s rule one may write
       
       
ˆ ˆ1 , ,ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ
        1
, ,
y r Je C y r C J k k r Je rq qW
C J r Je bb r Je W bq q
      
       
                  
            (A.3)
and




W r Je Cq  
                                                                  (A.5)
Using (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) we may get
  








       
 
(A.6.1)
   




W r C J k k r Jeqr

  
        
 
                         (A.6.2)
   




r Je W bq 
   
  
                             (A.6.3)
   
   
ˆ 1
. 1 0ˆ ,
W
r Je bqb
    
 
                  (A.6.4)
 
ˆ 1 0ˆ
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                                    (A.7.1)
  




Wr k J k
r

    
 
                                                                                       (A.7.2)
 ˆ 0ˆ W W b                                      (A.7.3)
 ˆ 1 0ˆ W bb






                                                          (A.7.5)
Appendix A.2: Effects on u  when  is exogenous
Taking total differentials of Equation (7) and using (A.7.1) to (A.7.5) and simplifications
we get
   ˆ 1 1 1 1 0
,ˆ
u Wy u eqy

           (A.8.1)
   ˆ 1 1 1 0
,ˆ
u Wr u e k J kqr

          (A.8.2)
   ˆ 1 1 1 0ˆ ,u W u e W bq 
          (A.8.3)
   ˆ 1 1 1 1 0ˆ ,u Wb u eqb 
          (A.8.4)
 ˆ 1 1 0ˆ ,u W u C re Jq   
             (A.8.5)
Appendix A.3: Effects on ,W   when  is endogenous
Taking total differentials of Equations (5) and (6) and after simplifications one gets
     ˆˆ ˆ ˆ1
,
W J W r Je yy J k rrq                          (A.9)
   ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ1WW C b y C rk b yy rkr                                          (A.10)
Using Crammer’s rule one may write
8       
       
ˆ ˆ1 , ,ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ
        1
, ,
y r Je C y r C J k k r Je rq qW
C J r Je bb r Je W bq q
      
       
                  
          (A.11)
and
       ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 | 1W yy J k rr W b bb yy rkr J                                (A.12)
where
   1 0
,
W r Je C Jq   
                         (A.13)
Using (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13) one gets





                                                                                        (A.14.1)
  




Wr k J k Jk
r

         
 
                                                                   (A.14.2)
  ˆ 1 0ˆ W W b J                                                                                           (A.14.3)
  ˆ 1 1 0ˆ W J bb

                                                                   (A.14.4)
Taking total differentials of (7) and using (A.6.1)- (A.6.4),  (A.14.1)-(A.14.4) and after
simplification we get
  ˆˆˆ 1 1 0
, ,ˆ ˆ ˆ
u W
u e e
w qy y y

 
                
(A.15.1)
  ˆˆˆ 1 1 0
, ,ˆ ˆ ˆ
u W
u e e
w qr r r

 
                     
(A.15.2)
 
1ˆˆˆ ,1 1 0 iffˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,
,
W equ W




     
                               
(A.15.3)
9 
1ˆˆˆ ,1 1 0 iffˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,
,
W equ W
u e e e




                               
(A.15.4)
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